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High Stakes Decision Making:
Normative, Descriptive and Prescriptive Considerations
Abstract
This paper reviews the state of the art of research on individual decision-making
in high-stakes, low-probability settings. A central theme of the discussion is that
optimally resolving high-stakes decisions poses a formidable challenge not only to naïve
decision makers, but also to users of more sophisticated tools such as decision analysis..
Such problems are difficult to resolve because precise information about probabilities is
not available, and the dynamics of the decision are complex. When faced with such
problems, naïve decision-makers fall prey to a wide range of potentially harmful biases,
such as not recognizing a high-stakes problem, ignoring the information about
probabilities that does exist, and responding to complexity by accepting the status quo.
We offer an agenda for future research focusing on how the process and outcomes of
high-stakes decision making might be improved.
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On September 11, 2001, terrorists attacked the United States. Some 3000 lives
were lost, primarily due to the destruction of the World Trade Center towers. The direct
damage to property and indirect losses such as business interruption could be as high as
as $40 billion. The event was unanticipated, indeed hardly imagined, even though
terrorists had launched a powerful, albeit mostly unsuccessful attack on the World Trade
Center in 1993 and more recently destroyed the U.S. embassies in Dar Es Salaam and
Nairobi. Moreover, there was ample information that the U.S. was a prime terrorist
target, and that known terrorists were taking pilot training. Assessments of the attack
indicate that intelligence failed massively, and that airport security was lax. Why the lack
of preparation? As unique as this tragedy may have been, the decision-making errors that
led to it were all-too familiar; as a society and individuals we inherently have difficulty
contemplating and taking protective actions against low probability, high stakes threats,
be they induced by nature or, as on September 11, systematically planned by an
opponent.
This paper primarily addresses the way individuals rather than governments make
decisions about low probability, high-stakes events. The stakes from these actions are
dwarfed by the losses in the terrorist attack. We believe, however, that most of the
lessons learned about individual decisions carry over to collective decisions, whether by
firms, nonprofits, or various government organizations.
Introduction
The decisions that matter most in life are often those that we are least prepared to
make. While our skills may be sophisticated in navigating the net, choosing brands from
supermarket shelves, and selecting routes to work, life offers few opportunities to train
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for decisions where the consequences of a poor choice are large and, once made, difficult
to reverse. High-stakes decisions, such as what health therapies to adopt and what
investment policies to follow, are fraught with high levels of uncertainty and complexity;
normative guidance for making them is scarce. What makes these decisions challenging
is thus not just the specter of the possible consequences of error, but the awareness of the
naiveté with which we are forced to approach them.
How skilled are people at making choices when faced with decisions where there
is a low but ambiguous probability of experiencing a high stakes loss? What light do
current normative theories of choice shed on how people should decide between
alternative options? Can we develop prescriptive guidelines for improving decisionmaking processes in high-stakes settings? These are some of the questions that were the
focus of a four-day workshop that sought to establish what we currently know about these
issues, and to formulate an agenda for future research. In this paper we review the
outcome of these discussions.
The Anatomy of High-Stakes Decisions
Consider the following decision problem:
You are considering purchasing a flood insurance policy for your home on the
banks of the Brown River. You are not too worried about a flood since the Brown
is not considered particularly flood prone. On the other hand, you know that a
severe flood could cause substantial damage or even destroy your home. Should
you purchase the insurance?
This is an example of a class of decision problems that we term high-stakes decisions,
defined as problems that share two distinctive properties:
A. The existence of large financial and/or emotional prospective loss outcomes;
and
B. The presence of high costs to reversing a decision once it is made.
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Over the past forty years a large literature has evolved that has sought to
investigate how individuals make such decisions, focusing on the contrast between how
these decisions should be me made by rational agents (such as by applying principles of
expected-utility theory) and how they commonly are made. The central conclusion has
been disturbing; the presence of potentially catastrophic costs of errors does little to
assuage the human tendency to make decisions using simplified heuristics (or rules of
thumb) that, at times, yield decisions that significantly depart from those that would be
prescribed by normative models. These features include:
•

Under- utilization of probability information and failure to differentiate among
probabilities The rational use of probability information is central to any
normative analysis of a high-stakes decision. Yet, several studies show that
people either insufficiently utilize probability information when it is made
available to them, or ignore it altogether. Huber, Wider, and Huber (1997), for
example, report the results of a study where only 22 percent of subjects sought out
probability information when evaluating several risky managerial decisions.
Even when another group of respondents in this same study was given precise
probability information, less than 20 percent mentioned the word probability in
their verbal protocols.
Likewise, individuals and firms frequently treat the likelihood of outcomes
with high-stakes losses as sufficiently low that they consider them not worth
worrying about, thus leading inaction by the decision maker. By assuming that
these events will “not happen to me,” they are effectively treating their probability
as zero, or close to it. In a laboratory experiment on purchasing insurance
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(McClelland, Schulze, and Coursey 1993), or warranties (Schade and Kunreuther
2001), many individuals bid zero for coverage, apparently viewing the probability
of a loss as sufficiently small that they were not interested in protecting
themselves against it.
Similarly, many residents of communities that are potential sites for
nuclear waste facilities have a tendency to dismiss the risk as negligible.
(Oberholzer-Gee 1998). Prior to the Bhopal chemical accident in 1984, for
example, firms in the industry estimated the chances of such an accident as
sufficiently low that that it was not on their radar screen .
•

An excessive focus on short time horizons. Many high-stakes decisions are not
recognized as such by decision makers because of a tendency to see only on the
immediate consequence of actions. Teenagers, for example, often have difficulty
seeing the long-term consequences of experimenting with smoking, and
governments and firms often fail to appreciate the long-term costs of failing to
invest in infrastructures. This tendency toward myopia is one of the most widelydocumented failings of human decision making; as a rule, we have difficulty
considering the future consequences of current actions over long time horizons
(see, e.g., Meyer and Hutchinson 2000). Hence, we see decision makers fail to
invest in measures that make their houses more disaster-resistant (Kunreuther,
Onculer and Slovic 1998), under-invest in energy-saving appliances (Hausman
1979), and undervalue the benefits of exploratory medical testing (Luce and Kahn
1999).
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•

Excessive attention to affectual cues. Affect and emotions strongly influence
decisions involving uncertain outcomes with large consequences (Slovic, et al
2001; Loewenstein et al 2001). Decisions requiring difficult trade-offs between
attributes or entailing ambiguity as to what would constitute a “right” answer,
often lead individuals to resolve choices by focusing on cues that send the
strongest affective signals.
To illustrate, Slovic, et al (2001) report the results of an experiment in
which a group of subjects was asked to place a value on new airport safety
equipment that would save 150 lives for sure under certain circumstances. Other
groups were then asked the same question, with one change: only proportions of
150 lives, ranging from 85% to 98%, would be saved. Common sense would
dictate that saving the 150 lives for sure would be valued most highly. However,
subjects who did not see the prospects side-by-side provided higher evaluations
for all proportions greater than 90%. Why? The authors suggest that terms like
“98% success rate” carry a strongly positive, commonly held, affective
association that inflates responses, an illustration of what they term the affect
heuristic.
The affect heuristic may also drive people to undertake protective
measures, even if experts estimate the chances of disaster to be extremely low.
Such behavior would not arise from risk aversion in the classic sense; i.e., a
calculated assessment of the expected utility of mitigation under a concave loss
function. Rather, it emerges from a visceral response to the mere existence of
risk, with no consideration for probabilities.
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•

Distortions under stress. Many high-stakes decisions produce high levels of
perceived stress. A large number of empirical studies find that if the stress level is
not too high it focuses decision makers on a selective set of cues when evaluating
options (e.g., Kahn and Baron 1995; Ben Zur and Breznitz 1981; Kahn and Luce
2001) and leads them to make greater use of simplifying heuristics (e.g., Luce,
Bettman, and Payne 1997).
Whether such selective attention depreciates the quality of high-stakes
decisions is unclear. It may allow decision makers to make more reliable use of
existing salient cues, something that can enhance performance in some settings
(see, e.g., Hammond 2000). However, where comprehensive processing is
necessary, stress can hamper decisions. For example, Levi and Tetlock (1980)
found that the Japanese navy’s chief-of-staff’s discussions with officials during
1941 became increasingly rhetorical and less integrative as the decision to attack
the United States approached, perhaps making the decision increasingly
irrevocable.
Over-reliance on social norms. A central feature of most high-stakes decisions
is that individuals have little experience dealing with them, and are highly
uncertain about how to resolve them—what Hogarth, Michaud and Mery (1980)
term procedural uncertainty. In such cases a natural resolution is to adopt the
decision strategies used by others, or follow established social norms (e.g., Kahn
and Baron 1995; Sunstein 1996). The risk, of course, is that established rules and
norms may be misguided, something that will reinforce rather than eliminate
biases.
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To illustrate, consider the decision on whether to invest in protection against
a natural disaster. Not surprisingly, people who bought flood or earthquake
insurance in the 1970s remarked that the most important reason for purchasing
coverage was that someone else had done so. However, many of the originally
insured had little information on the actual costs of coverage or the risks
associated with future disasters, suggesting that these new decisions were, in
many cases, perpetuations of earlier errors (Kunreuther et al 1978).
•

The tendency to prefer the status quo. What happens when individuals are
presented with difficult choices with multiple options and no obvious right
answer? A common reaction is to make no decision at all—either by opting for a
status quo course of action or, if there is none, walking away from the decision
entirely (Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988; Schwartz et al 2002)—a tendency
termed the status-quo bias.
The particular danger for high-stakes decisions is that decision makers
must resolve difficult trade-offs, where many courses of action are better than a
status quo. When faced with decisions that involve life-and-death trade offs,
people frequently remark, “I’d rather not think about it”, or relegate the decision
to an agent—both potentially dysfunctional responses (Schwartz et al 2002).

•

Failures to learn. If individuals could learn well from experience, their limited
information about the likelihood and consequence of uncertain events would be
less of an obstacle to effective decision making. Unfortunately, there is little
empirical basis for such optimism about high-stakes choices. There are little data
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from which to learn, and feedback is commonly sparse and censored.
As an illustration, Meyer and Hutchinson (2001) report evidence that
participants in an earthquake simulation tended to over-invest in mitigation that
was normatively ineffective but under-invest when it is normatively effective.
The reason was misinterpretation of feedback; when mitigation was ineffective,
respondents attributed the persistence of damage to the fact that they had not
invested enough. By contrast, when it was effective, they attributed the absence
of damage to a belief that earthquakes posed limited damage risks!
Can High-Stakes Decisions be Made More Effective?
The above features of decision making involve limitations in our ability to process
information, but their effects are not necessarily destructive. In many situations,
heuristics and biases are optimal adaptations to routine problems (e.g., Payne, Bettman,
and Johnson 1988). For example, for most common forecasting tasks a recency bias can
be beneficial. If we see an acquaintance in a bad mood at 1PM, he is likely to still feel
sour an hour later. The best single predictor of the weather tomorrow is, in fact, the
weather today. Such simple extrapolations may catch us without an umbrella when it
rains, but the costs are likely to be minimal.
In contrast, in many high-stakes decisions this heuristic is decidedly
inappropriate, and the cost of misapplication can be huge. For example, as memories of a
flood recede, many individuals construct houses on the flood plain believing that it will
not happen to me. In fact, it is not uncommon to hear residents in these areas say: “We
just had our 100 year flood so we won’t have another one for a while.” Improving highstakes decisions will not simply be a matter of stamping out decision makers' biases.

9

Rather, they must learn to intuitively recognize when biases may actually help decision
making, and when they are likely to be harmful. Such discrimination would be
challenging even to a trained decision analyst.
With this caveat in mind, we can identify two ways for achieving this goal:
1. Teach prescriptive heuristics to individuals Although standard models of
rational decision making-- incorporating Bayesian analysis and Von NeumannMorgenstern utility functions -- will not resolve many high-stakes decisions, they
can help individuals improve the choice process by think about the chances of
certain events occurring and the relevant types of tradeoffs that should be
considered. Statistical training has been shown to have a strong effect on
inductive reasoning on performance in the short-run (Fong, Krantz, & Nisbett
1986), and may help improve high-stakes decision making.
As we have noted above, however, in many cases the core problem is not
that decision makers are unaware of the need to consider relative probabilities and
consequences, but rather are limited in their ability to process this information in
an optimal manner. Remedying this calls for the development of prescriptive
heuristics, or rules of thumb that enhance normative processing in light of natural
processing limitations. Consider, for example, the difficulty that individuals have
in evaluating low-probability risks. People are likely to be more sensitive to the
probability dimension if risks are presented in a concrete form, so the decision
making has a clear context for evaluating a given likelihood (Hsee 1996). An
individual with little understanding of a probability of 0.000001 might better
interpret it when it is expressed in relation to a familiar probabilistic event, such
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as the risk of an automobile accident, or by translating probabilities into
frequencies (e,g,, Slovic, Monahan, and MacGregor 2000)..
Adjusting the time frame also enhance the accuracy of risk perceptions.
For example, if a firm is considering earthquake protection over the 25-year life
of a plant, managers are far more likely to take the risk seriously if they are told
the chance of an earthquake is 1 in 4 during the entire period rather than 1 in 100
in any given year (Weinstein, Kolb, and Goldstein 1996). Similarly, people are
more willing to wear seatbelts if they are told they have a one third chance of a
serious accident over a 50-year driving lifetime of driving rather than a 0.00001
chance each trip (Slovic, Fischhoff, and Lichtenstein (1978).
Similar framing approaches might also help address other decisionmaking biases, such the reluctance to take costly actions now whose benefits exist
only in the future—such as convincing teenagers not to start smoking. EU-type
arguments that focus on the conditional probabilities of incurring lung cancer and
heart disease later in life are not promising. But teenagers may be swayed by
salient visual demonstrations of the immediate consequences of smoking on the
lungs, esophagus, teeth and other parts of the body—demonstrations that hold
high affective content, and hence get heavily weighted.
Finally, there also evidence that decision making can be improved by
encouraging decision makers to see events through alternative frames, such as
gains versus losses and changes in the status-quo. In medical decisions there may
be major differences between how a patient views a costly therapy that is
presented in terms of extending life or precluding a shortening of life. Likewise,
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preferences for insurance policies can be dramatically altered by changing what
constitutes the default coverage (Johnson, et al 1993).
2. Develop Financial Incentives Improved training and finding more effective
means to present information are, of course, only partial remedies for enhancing
the quality of high-stakes decisions. For example, making the long-term
consequences of actions more salient through affect-laden communications may
help moderate the myopia bias it will never eliminate it entirely, particularly
when the bias is exacerbated by real constraints such as limited budgets for
investing in certain activities. Such situations often argue for overt intervention by
materially altering the cost structure of decision problems. For example, one can
make opportunity costs salient by providing explicit monetary incentives for
undertaking protective actions, or avoiding harmful behaviors. While a
homeowner in a marginally hurricane-prone area may have difficulty envisioning
the long-term benefits of spending $10,000 for storm shutters, this can be made
concrete by offering her long-term insurance discounts for undertaking the
improvement, and providing a loan (perhaps attached to the mortgage) that speads
the costs of the measure over a long period.
Up until now, we have overlooked issues in decision-making that arise when
biases are the source of risk rather than simply an obstacle to its resolution. Firms
pollute, homebuilders cut corners on construction, and governments fail to curb
global warming because the consequences seem both distant and, often, more
likely to be incurred by others rather than themselves. The distortions of myopia
are powerful, and its effects potentially devastating. In such instances legislative
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intervention may be called for to either force long-term thinking when it is
neglected or to offer explicit incentives for doing so. Examples are numerous,
such as in building codes and safety standards. While many industry groups
lobby against such restrictions (arguing that they are costly and unneeded), the
fact remains that citizens will inherently be at higher risk without them.

Conclusions and Agenda
The goals of better understanding the psychology of high-stakes decision making
and improving the quality of decision outcomes are closely intertwined. Once we
understand the biases that limit intuitive solutions, we can understand where normative
theory holds its greatest benefits. Likewise, the best prescriptive aids for decision
making will likely be those that are congruent with the processes that arise naturally in
problem-solving.
With this in mind, we identified five critical areas for future research that reflect
this intertwining of normative and descriptive research agendas:
1.

Develop a better normative model of choice for high-stakes decision
making that incorporates psychological considerations such as affect,
hyperbolic discounting, status quo bias, non-Bayesian learning, framing,
and non-linear treatment of probabilities. The traditional arguments for
ignoring such effects are compelling in repeated-decision contexts, such as
stock investing. However, they apply less cogently to one-time only
decisions, such as critical medical decisions. A generalized model would
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not recommend specific actions, but rather help a decision maker explore
alternatives in a model that realistically captures their behavior.
2.

Provide better theories of high-stakes decisions at the group,
organizational and societal levels. Most understanding about high-stakes
decision-making comes from the study of individuals. We know
surprisingly little about how such decisions are resolved by groups, firms,
and governments, and the role that social influences play on individual
decisions (Zeckhauser and Viscusi 1990).

3.

Generate more systematic evidence on the efficacy and limitations of
training. Can people be trained to think like statistical decision makers
when making high-stakes decisions? What are the most effective heuristic
training devices for improving the quality of these decisions? Does training
in de-biasing generalize over time and context? Our current knowledge
about these fundamental questions is largely anecdotal.

4.

Improve tools for representing ambiguous probabilities and uncertain outcome

spaces. Earlier we noted that a major challenge facing attempts to apply standard
normative theory to high-stakes decisions is that our knowledge of the outcome space is
almost always incomplete; we know neither what the full set of consequences might be
nor the probabilities that should be associated with these consequences. We need tools
for representing ambiguous decision problems—possibly drawing from descriptive
research on how individuals intuitively deal with this type of uncertainty.
5.

Conduct empirical tests of how financial incentives play a role in

dealing with high stake decisions. Financial incentives can naturally lead
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individuals to better long-run decision outcomes—such as explicitly
rewarding long-term investing. The design of these incentives requires a
better understanding of their goals as well as the types of heuristics they
use in making decisions. More controlled experiments and pilot studies
need to be undertaken to determine how well alternative incentive
programs would perform.
As a final note, just as most of our decision making skills focus on solving recurring,
relatively low-stakes tasks, so too has most of the academic literature in applied choice
modeling. We know an enormous amount about how consumers choose modes of transit
to commute to work, select among brands of coffee, and, more recently, select web sites
to visit. By comparison we know much less about how individuals solve the complex
problems that are often far more critical to both themselves and to society—how we
make fundamental decisions about their health, or choose collectively how much to
invest in precautions against global terrorism. Such decisions are not sufficiently
captured by the tools of standard applied choice modeling, where choice primarily
involves a static, dispassionate, comparison of options. The study of the distinctive
features of high-stakes decision making is just beginning. It rationally merits the interests
of an expanding set of theoretical and applied researchers.
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